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Developing Country Revenue Mobilisation: a Proposal to Modify the 
‘Transactional Net Margin’ Transfer Pricing Method 
 
Michael C. Durst 
 
 
Summary 
  
Developing countries tend to rely more heavily than wealthier countries on corporate tax 
revenue from multinational companies operating in their jurisdiction. Therefore, the practice that 
the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) has labelled ‘base 
erosion and profit shifting’ (BEPS) – the diversion of taxable income by multinational groups from 
countries where they conduct business to other, zero- and low-tax countries – poses an 
especially challenging problem for developing countries.  
 
Some of developing countries’ vulnerability to BEPS stems from the manner in which the 
Transactional Net Margin Method (TNMM), a particular transfer pricing method (method for 
dividing the income of a multinational group among the countries where the group operates), 
which is permitted under OECD guidelines, is currently being applied in practice. This paper 
argues that developing countries might be made less vulnerable to profit shifting if the OECD 
modifies TNMM in several respects. In particular, this paper suggests that: (i) the current 
dependence of TNMM on searches for ‘uncontrolled comparables’ be replaced by benchmarking 
based on the global profitability of the taxpayer’s multinational group; and (ii) the accounting 
rules used under TNMM be changed, so that the method is capable of reducing profit shifting 
through payment of interest on loans from affiliates, as well as from other kinds of related-party 
transactions. 
 
As a first step in considering these proposals for implementation, the OECD and perhaps other 
international organisations will need to work with national tax administrations in order to develop 
reasonable estimates of the likely revenue effects. In addition, as a political matter, adoption of 
the suggested changes to TNMM will require multinational companies, and the governments that 
represent their interests, to be willing to exercise a degree of restraint in their tax policymaking in 
favour of the fiscal interests of developing countries. If that restraint is forthcoming, however, and 
revenue estimates prove encouraging, then changes to TNMM along the lines suggested below 
might contribute to worthwhile improvements in the current North/South fiscal balance. 
 
Keywords: transfer pricing; developing countries; OECD; transactional net margin method 
(TNMM); base erosion and profit shifting (BEPS). 
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Introduction 
 
Over the past several years, the OECD, under instructions from the G-20 group of the world’s 
largest economies, has been coordinating efforts among governments to devise remedies for 
the perceived problem of base erosion and profit shifting (BEPS).1 BEPS refers to the ability of 
members of multinational groups, under tax laws currently in effect around the world, to divert 
taxable income from countries where the groups conduct business to other zero- or low-tax 
countries where the groups may conduct few, if any, activities. The diversion of business profits 
under BEPS tax-planning structures appears to have eroded the tax bases of countries at all 
levels of economic development. Revenue losses from BEPS, however, are often seen as 
especially serious for developing countries, where the income of local affiliates of multinational 
groups often accounts for a large proportion of the revenue that is potentially reachable by tax 
authorities.2 
 
The OECD’s BEPS study has, in the author’s view, produced unprecedentedly clear analyses of 
the causes and mechanisms of international profit shifting under corporate tax, and has 
generated legislative and administrative proposals that, if adopted by governments around the 
world, should reduce the incidence of profit shifting around the world. As would be true of any 
serious re-evaluation of international tax laws, however, the BEPS project has throughout been 
affected by political pressures to limit any resulting increase to the effective tax burden faced by 
cross-border investment and trade.3 Moreover, the issues that the BEPS process addresses are 
technically, as well as politically, complex. The BEPS recommendations in their current form, 
therefore, cannot realistically be seen as the last word in international tax reform. Instead, the 
BEPS project should be understood as a step in a long-term and continuing process of evolution 
toward a more satisfactorily functioning global system of international taxation. 
 
As a suggested addition to the currently pending BEPS recommendations, this paper 
recommends that the OECD, and tax policymakers in national governments, consider modifying 
the rules for application of the Transactional Net Margin Method (TNMM), which is one of the 
transfer pricing methods that almost all countries in the world currently use, under guidelines 
                                                          
1  The OECD maintains a website containing its ongoing BEPS analyses at <www.oecd.org>. For a summary of the BEPS 
project at year-end 2015, see Finley (2015). 
2  For discussion of the potential significance of the BEPS project for developing countries, see IMF (2014) and OECD (2014a). 
3  The political forces that have, from the start, confronted the BEPS efforts reflect longstanding economic and political 
pressure faced by countries to limit attempts to collect taxes on income from companies’ cross-border operations – the same 
pressures of tax competition that gave rise in the first instance to countries’ toleration of widespread profit shifting by 
multinational groups. The pressures of tax competition have discouraged the implementation of effective corporate tax 
regimes by countries at all levels of wealth and economic development. The wealthier capital-exporting nations, which tend 
to be home to most of the world’s large multinationals, have been willing to forgo the ability to tax their home-based 
multinationals on income from their international operations, in order to place the home-based multinationals in a competitive 
tax position relative to multinationals based in other countries. The world’s developing countries, which tend to be importers 
of capital, have been willing to forgo taxation of the income of multinationals doing business in their countries in order to 
encourage inbound investment. The willingness of developing countries to forgo taxation of inbound investors has long been 
reflected in a variety of tax incentives, some of which are offered explicitly (as in the case of tax holidays offered to inbound 
investors), and others implicitly (as in the case of governments’ toleration of income-stripping through BEPS). For an 
important early reflection on this phenomenon, see Avi-Yonah (2000). For a more recent discussion focused on developing 
countries, see Durst (2015a). 
In recent years, China and India – countries that have reason to perceive themselves as having inherent economic 
advantages in attracting inbound investment – have been exceptions to the general rule of acquiescence in today’s 
international tax regime, and often have advocated moving the international fiscal balance in favour of ‘source’ countries. 
See, for example, Dhillon (2015) and Desouza (2015). In addition, Brazil employs a system of fixed margins for transfer 
pricing purposes, instead of the comparables-based system prescribed by the OECD; this posture may reflect dissatisfaction 
with the results that are typically obtained under OECD practices (see United Nations (2013 Chapter 10-2)). With the 
exception of these countries, however, relatively little opposition to current tax planning structures seems to have been 
voiced by officials of developing country governments. 
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maintained by the OECD,4 to seek to enforce appropriate levels of income for locally operating 
members of multinational groups. The OECD’s current transfer pricing guidelines reflect a long 
history of international rulemaking regarding the division of income among countries for tax 
purposes; this history began under the auspices of the League of Nations in the 1920s and 
1930s, and achieved further development through US regulatory efforts beginning in the 1960s, 
and various releases of Transfer Pricing Guidelines by the OECD, primarily in 1979 and 1995.5 
At the inception of the BEPS study, officials expressed concern that existing transfer pricing 
methods were affording multinational groups undue latitude for profit shifting, and a primary 
objective of the BEPS work has been to recommend changes that would strengthen transfer 
pricing rules. The BEPS reports that were released in late 2015 include an extensive analysis of 
transfer pricing rules, and significant suggestions for modifications to existing practices.6 The 
BEPS recommendations, however, are targeted to particular provisions of the Transfer Pricing 
Guidelines, and do not include recommended revisions to TNMM.7 
 
This paper offers for consideration changes to the rules of the OECD Guidelines governing 
implementation of the TNMM.8 The modifications are intended to remove some elements of 
TNMM that historically have reduced the method’s effectiveness in constraining erosion of the 
tax bases of developing countries. The remainder of this paper: (i) describes the role that TNMM 
typically plays in the tax planning structures used by multinational groups today, and (ii) offers a 
technical explanation of the proposed modifications to TNMM. 
 
In reviewing these proposals, it should be recognised that an important step in considering their 
implementation will be to subject the proposals to careful revenue estimates, presumably 
performed by the OECD in cooperation with national tax administrations, and perhaps other 
international organisations. These kinds of revenue estimates are a prerequisite for disciplined 
consideration of any significant change to tax rules. It is hoped that the suggestions made below 
will demonstrate enough potential benefit to developing countries to justify the cost and effort 
required for the necessary revenue estimates, so that serious consideration of these proposals 
will be possible. 
 
 
1  The use of TNMM in tax planning practices 
 
1.1 Historical background of OECD transfer pricing methods 
 
When it initiated the first steps in the long historical development of today’s transfer pricing laws, 
the League of Nations made what would prove to be a durable choice, on the part of the world 
                                                          
4  The OECD maintains its guidelines under the title Transfer Pricing Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises and Tax 
Administrations (OECD various years). The Guidelines are revised from time to time (as they have been recently, in 
connection with the OECD’s BEPS studies). Rules for the Transactional Net Margin Method are found in paragraphs 2.58-
2.107 of the OECD Guidelines. 
5  Historical discussions can be found in Avi-Yonah (1995); Avi-Yonah and Clausing (2007); Durst and Culbertson (2003); 
Langbein (1986); Wells and Lowell (2012). 
6  The OECD has released its recommendations regarding the modification of transfer pricing rules in its report on Actions 8-10 
under the BEPS recommendations. See note 1 above. 
7  In the course of the BEPS analysis, the OECD and other international organisations have described practical difficulties that 
developing countries appear to face in applying TNMM, especially as those difficulties appear to be affecting developing 
countries, and the OECD and other international organisations are committed to working with developing country 
governments toward alleviation of these difficulties. See, e.g., OECD (2014b). No changes to the rules governing TNMM, 
however, have been proposed.  
8  The technical discussion in this paper of a suggested new transfer pricing method relies on early explorations of this topic by 
the author: Durst (2015b, 2015c, 2015d, 2012). 
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community, between two possible approaches to dividing the income of a multinational business 
group among the countries in which the group conducts business.9 One approach is called 
unitary taxation or formulary apportionment: it involves the computation of a group’s total global 
income, from all countries, and the division of that income according to a formula that is 
designed to measure the relative amount of business activity conducted in the different 
countries.10 The states of the United States had already been using a formulary approach for the 
division of income for several decades when the League of Nations committee conducted its 
review; the approach had proven satisfactory to the US states, and indeed the states continue to 
use a formulary approach today – as do the Canadian provinces. The League of Nations 
concluded, however, that it would be infeasible and unnecessary to try to construct a formula 
that might be used for the apportionment of income on the international scale, and instead 
recommended use of an alternative system for the division of income, which is based on what 
has come to be known as the arm’s-length principle. The arm’s-length principle continues to 
govern transfer pricing rules under the OECD Guidelines, and debate over its continued utility 
has been one focus of the recent international conversation about BEPS. 
 
Under the arm’s-length principle, a multinational group is required to divide its income among 
countries, for tax purposes, in the same manner in which the group’s income would be divided if 
the members of the group were unrelated business entities transacting with one another at arm’s 
length. For example, if a US member of a multinational group were to mine 100 tons of coal in 
the US and sell the coal for distribution to an affiliated company located in Mexico, the parties to 
the sale would be required under the arm’s-length principle to price the coal at its fair market 
value, presumably determined by reference to prices for comparable coal observable in the 
marketplace. 
 
Of course, even in the 1920s and 1930s many transactions among members of multinational 
business groups were more complicated than sales of raw coal or other commodities, and as 
technology has developed over the decades the complexity of transactions among group 
members has increased dramatically. Arm’s-length transfer pricing therefore has never been as 
simple as determining market prices of raw commodities that might be transferred among group 
members. In practice, it is impossible to account separately for all of the thousands of 
transactions that occur among the members of a complex multinational business group 
members in the course of, say, a year, and identify with any degree of confidence market prices 
for the large variety of goods and services that are transferred in these transactions. As a result, 
application of the arm’s-length principle has developed largely into a system of stylised 
benchmarking of the net incomes of certain affiliates within multinational groups, under the rubric 
of TNMM. 
 
Under the OECD Guidelines, taxpayers and tax administrations are to use TNMM to test 
whether the incomes of certain kinds of business operations – in particular, distribution, 
manufacturing, and service-providing operations (for example, data processing operations and 
customer service call-in centres) – that multinational groups typically establish around the world, 
are earning incomes at levels consistent with the arm’s-length standard. TNMM, as contained in 
the OECD Guidelines, is based on ‘comparables’. Consider, for example, a distribution 
                                                          
9  See note 5 above. 
10  The author has compiled an analysis of the feasibility of global formulary apportionment for tax purposes, including a 
historical summary of the topic, in Durst (2015e). Although the author believes that a careful and open-minded study of 
formulary approaches can benefit policymakers of countries at all levels of economic development, the author has cautioned 
against attempts by countries to seek to implement formulary systems unilaterally (see Durst (2015f)). The current paper can 
be seen as entailing the incorporation of one characteristic element of a formulary system – reference to a group’s 
consolidated global profitability – into a transfer pricing method that generally would retain the traditional features and 
structure of an arm’s-length method. 
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subsidiary that a multinational beverages group might establish in Country A. The subsidiary 
might report on its Country A tax return that it has earned a net operating margin (ratio of 
operating income to sales) during the taxable year of 3.5 per cent. The subsidiary is supposed to 
have reviewed these results by reference to the results of comparable distributors of similar 
products in Country A that are not members of multinational groups. The tax authority is then 
entitled under TNMM to review the taxpayer’s determination by conducting the authority’s own 
analysis of available data from comparables; if the taxpayer’s reported income is materially lower 
than the level indicated by the tax authority’s analysis, the tax authority can propose an upward 
adjustment to the subsidiary’s income.  
 
1.2 TNMM’s role in international tax planning 
 
The use of TNMM by multinationals in global tax planning involves several conceptual steps. 
First, the group will form companies, to serve as what are typically referred to as hub or principal 
companies, in zero- or low-tax countries.11 The group typically will cause these hub companies 
to enter into contracts with the group’s operating entities around the world – the various 
distribution, manufacturing and service-provider subsidiaries through which the group conducts 
its business – under which the hub companies claim to indemnify the operating subsidiaries 
against most of their major business risks. In legal form, the contracts establish the operating 
subsidiaries essentially as servants of the hub companies, performing their business operations 
at the behest of and under the financial protection of the hubs. 
 
It is a hallmark of this kind of tax structure that the hub companies physically perform few active 
business functions of their own: instead, the hubs typically have few employees, with the great 
bulk of the group’s personnel distributed among the group’s many operating subsidiaries. The 
contracts therefore tend to reflect a certain amount of artificiality, in that they provide for many of 
the risks of a business to be borne in countries where few, if any, of the activities that give rise to 
those risks are performed. As a legal matter, however, the risk-limiting contracts established 
under the tax planning structure conform to patterns that might be found in agreements made 
between unrelated companies acting at arm’s-length; under longstanding legal principles, tax 
administrations around the world generally respect their bona fides.12  
 
The groups involved in these kinds of contractually based tax planning structures typically 
perform transfer pricing analyses, under TNMM, based on the theory that the protection against 
risk afforded to the group’s operating subsidiaries entitles the subsidiaries to earn only limited 
levels of operating income, consistent with the results observed among the simplest kinds of 
business entities for which comparables data can be found. In general, tax administrations 
around the world have not challenged the sufficiency of the levels of income reported by local 
subsidiaries under this approach.13 As a result, the use of the hub structure, based upon 
                                                          
11  Although many countries are willing to host hub companies, the Cayman Islands, Bermuda, and the British Virgin Islands are 
among the jurisdictions in which multinational groups establish their hubs. The legal arrangements involved in hub-based tax 
planning are discussed in detail in Kleinbard (2011a, 2011b) and US Congress (2010). A report that is highly critical of the 
effects of hub tax planning structures on developing countries has been compiled by the non-governmental organisation 
ActionAid (ActionAid 2012). 
12  The extent to which tax administrations should be required to respect contractual arrangements made between commonly-
owned entities has long been controversial. As a matter of legal principle, however, respect for the separate legal personality 
of the different members of commonly-owned corporate groups seems central to the institution of corporate-level taxation, 
and it is difficult to envision tax rules under the current arm’s-length transfer pricing paradigm that would not afford a high 
level of deference to intragroup contracts. See, for example, the discussion in Durst and Culbertson (2003: 114-122). 
13  Notable exceptions to this tendency have been India and China, which are often reported as challenging what they perceive 
to be low levels of subsidiary income determined by taxpayers’ applications of TNMM (see note 3 above). The extent to 
which the apparent reluctance of other countries to challenge TNMM results can be attributed to considerations of tax 
competition, to technical difficulties encountered by revenue administrations in applying TNMM, or to some combination of 
these two factors, cannot, of course, be determined. 
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networks of risk-limiting contracts, has become virtually universal among the world’s business 
groups. 
 
It seems likely to this author that the apparent toleration by most developing country 
governments of tax planning structures based on TNMM reflects, in large part, a homeostatic 
equilibrium that has developed in recent decades between countries’ desire for tax revenue on 
one hand, and their countervailing desire to keep corporate tax burdens low to avoid 
discouraging inbound investment. Numerous conversations in which the author has engaged 
with tax specialists around the world support this perception of political-economic equilibrium 
rather strongly. The possibility that global toleration of TNMM-based planning structures 
represents an economically determined equilibrium, however, does not mean that the 
perpetuation of the current equilibrium is normatively desirable. In particular, there is no reason 
to assume that the current equilibrium happens to have settled at a point that is optimal in terms 
of social well-being. To the contrary, it may well be the case that the current equilibrium leaves 
developing countries with corporate tax revenue that is insufficient to meet the countries’ 
reasonable economic and social needs. If that is the case, then measures designed to modify 
the current corporate tax equilibrium to some extent, in favour of developing countries, may 
provide significant net social benefits. 
 
As a matter of practical politics, given the pervasiveness of the forces of tax competition that 
have brought about the current North-South corporate tax equilibrium, measures designed to 
change the equilibrium are not likely to occur of their own accord. Instead, multinational 
companies, and the governments that represent their interests, will need to be willing to exercise 
a degree of restraint in their tax policymaking in favour of the fiscal interests of developing 
countries.14 Essentially these parties will need to be willing, as a group, to forgo tax advantages 
they would otherwise, as a matter of political and economic power, be able to retain, in order to 
assist developing countries in raising revenue to build social and economic infrastructure. This 
paper assumes that multinational companies and their governments do in fact perceive 
advantages, at both the humanitarian and economic levels, in improving the relative fiscal 
positions of developing countries, so that proposals like the one suggested in this paper are not 
entirely unrealistic as a political matter. 
 
The following section of this paper therefore proposes changes to the rules governing TNMM 
that are designed – subject, of course, to verification by revenue estimates – to enhance 
developing countries’ ability to raise corporate tax revenue, while at the same time avoiding 
increasing corporate tax burdens to competitively untenable levels. The proposals address two 
features of TNMM as currently configured in the OECD Guidelines: 
 
(i) Problems related to comparables. TNMM’s reliance on searches for uncontrolled 
comparables have long been perceived as posing serious and unresolved problems in 
administration. On economic grounds, there are reasons to expect close comparables for 
the activities performed by members of multinational groups to be difficult to locate, even in 
wealthy countries with highly developed economies.15 The difficulty of locating satisfactory 
comparables appear especially acute in developing countries, where few independent 
                                                          
14  See, e.g., Durst (2014). 
15  Essentially, the argument is that multinational groups form in industries where the common ownership of legal entities 
performing different functions is necessary in order to operate competitively. Therefore, in industries that are organised in 
international groups – precisely the industries for which transfer pricing regulation is required – few satisfactory comparables 
for, say, distribution and manufacturing subsidiaries are likely to be found. See, e.g., Durst and Culbertson (2003: 81-87). 
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companies of any kind are likely to exist that are publicly traded, and therefore do not report 
financial data in a format that is useful for analysis under TNMM.16  
(ii) Problems related to profit shifting through interest payments. Large volumes of profit shifting 
are attributable to payment of interest by corporate subsidiaries, on loans that have been 
extended to the subsidiaries by zero- or low-tax hub affiliates. TNMM, however, like other 
transfer pricing methods under the OECD Guidelines, generally requires taxpayers to report 
minimum levels of operating income, which is an accounting measurement of income before 
payment of interest. Historically, international tax law has not sought to limit the volume of 
interest payments between affiliates by means of transfer pricing rules, but on separate, 
specialised systems of rules for limiting interest on related-party debt. However, perhaps 
from pressures of tax competition, countries’ limitations on interest deductions have typically 
been of limited effect, or have been non-existent. The OECD, in its BEPS reports, has 
recommended some tightening of existing interest-limitation rules, but it is unclear whether 
these will lead in practice to substantial changes.17 The suggested changes to TNMM would 
seek to redress this difficulty to some extent by substituting ‘earnings before tax’ (EBT), a 
measure of a company’s earnings after payment of interest, in place of operating income as 
the basis for benchmarking under TNMM.   
 
 
2  How the proposed changes to TNMM would 
work 
 
The suggested revisions would leave the rules for TNMM identical to those now in the OECD 
Guidelines, except that: (i) benchmarking would not be based on searches for comparables, but 
taxpayers would instead be required to earn profit margins equal to 25 per cent of the global 
consolidated margin earned by the taxpayer’s multinational group; and (ii) the measure of 
profitability used for purposes of benchmarking under TNMM would be earnings before tax, 
instead of operating income.  
 
Consider for illustration the situation of a distribution subsidiary, Sellco, that earns $1 billion in 
revenue during the taxable year. If the multinational group of which Sellco is a member reports 
on its annual financial statements a consolidated EBT margin of 15 per cent, then the revised 
TNMM will require Sellco to earn an EBT margin of .25 x 15, or 3.75 per cent. Therefore, under 
the revised TNMM, Sellco’s income for the year should be $37.5 million. (If, alternatively, the 
consolidated group had operated at a loss for the year as measured by the group’s consolidated 
EBT, then Sellco would be permitted for tax purposes to report a corresponding loss, based on 
the 25 per cent rule. The loss would be subject to any carryover rules allowed under the locally 
applicable income tax laws.) 
 
In the case of a subsidiary that is not a distributor, but is instead a manufacturer, the revised 
TNMM would not base its benchmarking on the taxpayer’s return on sales, but instead – as is 
commonly the practice today under TNMM – on the taxpayer’s return on its total expenses. 
Consider, for example, a manufacturing subsidiary, Manuco, with total expenses of $800 million 
per year. If Manuco’s group earns a consolidated EBT return on total expenses of 24 per cent, 
                                                          
16  The OECD and other international organisations are committed to assisting developing countries in seeking remedies for 
current difficulties in locating comparables for use in transfer pricing administration (see note 7 above). The author hopes 
that the observations offered in this paper will be helpful in the design and implementation of this technical assistance effort.  
17  The BEPS recommendations relating to the limitation of interest deductions are found in the OECD’s report under BEPS 
Action 4. For a discussion of this topic, see Durst (2015g). 
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then Manuco would be required under the revised TNMM to earn an EBT margin of at least 0.25 
x 24, or 6 per cent, indicating an arm’s-length level of income of $48 million. Again, if application 
of the revised TNMM indicates that Manuco should incur a loss, the loss will be allowed for 
corporate tax purposes. (As is true under the current version of TNMM, subsidiaries that are 
neither distributors or manufacturers, but instead are engaged in the provision of services, might 
be benchmarked by reference either to their returns on sales or their returns on cost, depending 
on the clientele served by the particular subsidiary.)18  
 
The suggestion that the revised TNMM be applied using a coefficient of 0.25 – that is, that the 
taxpayer be required to report an EBT margin that is 25 per cent of the group’s consolidated 
margin – reflects several considerations. First, conceptually, it seems reasonable to assume that 
any single function of the taxpayer, like distribution, manufacturing, or the provision of services, 
is likely in itself to account for only a relatively small portion of the total income generated by a 
multinational group, and 25 per cent seems like a reasonable broad estimate of the appropriate 
percentage. Second, a coefficient of 25 per cent appears to lead to results that are roughly in 
line with expectations of practitioners, as recalled by the author, when TNMM was first 
developed in the early 1990s, but before its application in practice had been affected on a large 
scale by the proliferation of limited-risk subsidiaries. Ultimately, the choice of a particular 
coefficient reflects some degree of subjective judgment, but 25 per cent seems sensible (subject 
to verification by revenue estimates) if the revised method is to result in meaningful, but still 
relatively moderate, increases in effective tax burdens. 
 
The key to the improved administrability of the revised version of TNMM is its reliance for 
purposes of benchmarking on information taken from groups’ routinely reported financial results, 
rather than on data derived from attempted searches for comparables. Most large multinational 
groups publish their consolidated results annually, under the supervision of professional auditors 
and national securities regulators. Companies are unlikely to try to understate their global 
profitability, as that would put the companies at a disadvantage in the capital markets; therefore, 
the information on profitability that is published by multinational groups generally should be 
reliable for use in tax administration. Not all multinationals are publicly traded, but all but the 
smallest nevertheless maintain audited financial statements, and even those that do not typically 
will maintain some form of consolidated financial information. Also, those without audited 
statements are likely to be the smallest multinationals, for which little revenue is at stake under 
transfer pricing laws. 
 
 
3  Limitations and arguable shortcomings of the 
revised TNMM 
 
The suggested revisions to TNMM are not intended as a panacea for all problems of transfer 
pricing administration, but to provide a reasonable backup to current methods, and, in particular, 
to reduce the degree of profit shifting that the TNMM now permits in connection with the use of 
limited-risk subsidiaries. As a consequence of its deliberately limited reach, the revised TNMM 
                                                          
18 Subsidiaries that provide services primarily to unrelated customers in the local market (as might be the case, e.g., for a local 
subsidiary of a global oil drilling services group) typically are treated under TNMM similarly to distributors and benchmarked 
on the basis of return on sales. Subsidiaries that provide services mainly to related parties (for example, subsidiaries that 
provide R&D services, or operate customer call centres, for the benefit of other members of their commonly-controlled 
groups), typically are treated under TNMM similarly to manufacturers and are benchmarked on the basis of their returns on 
costs. 
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admittedly retains some of the weaknesses of current transfer pricing methods, including the 
current version of TNMM. 
 
In particular, the revised TNMM will continue to require the taxpayer and the tax authority to 
characterise particular subsidiaries or divisions within subsidiaries (tested parties) as 
distributors, manufacturers or particular kinds of service providers, and sometimes this 
characterisation is difficult to accomplish. In addition, the revised TNMM will continue, like OECD 
transfer pricing methods generally, to benchmark taxpayers’ book (financial statement) incomes, 
not their taxable incomes. This means that, even after revision, TNMM will continue to require 
the taxpayer and the tax authority to determine how results under the applicable transfer pricing 
method should be translated from book to taxable income – sometimes a difficult accounting 
task. The suggested revisions to TNMM do not attempt to address this significant 
methodological weakness, which seems unavoidable under any transfer pricing method that is in 
use today. 
 
Another limitation is that the revised TNMM would be useful to benchmark financial results only 
of the kinds of distribution, manufacturing and service operations to which TNMM currently is 
applied under the rules of the OECD Guidelines. Even after revision, TNMM would not be useful 
in benchmarking the incomes of other kinds of taxpayers, including those with especially 
complex operations. In particular, the revisions to TNMM would not solve the problem – currently 
unsolved under existing OECD transfer pricing methods – of evaluating the income of banks, 
insurance companies and other financial businesses. The revisions would, however, enable 
governments, including governments in developing countries with relatively limited tax 
administration resources, to reduce revenue losses in a large number of situations in which 
taxpayers have established tax planning structures based on the use of risk-limited distribution, 
manufacturing and service provider subsidiaries. 
 
Although the revised TNMM, by benchmarking based on EBT rather than operating income, will 
provide developing country governments with greater protection against excessive interest 
deductions than is available today, the protection provided by the revised TNMM will remain 
somewhat porous. Because the revised TNMM will not prescribe minimum EBT levels for a 
group’s entire operations within a particular country, but instead only for tested parties that have 
been identified for purposes of applying TNMM, some taxpayers will have opportunity to seek to 
apportion some or all of their interest deductions to portions of their operations that are not 
subject to TNMM. To the extent this occurs, tax administrations will need to rely not on transfer 
pricing rules, but instead on special rules for the limitation of interest deductions (which, as 
discussed above, tend to be quite weak in many countries) to prevent excessive revenue 
leakage.19 Therefore, although the suggested revisions to TNMM should help to some extent in 
reducing profit shifting through the use of interest deductions, institution of the suggested new 
method will not obviate the need for more effective overall limitations on interest deductions. 
 
The revised TNMM might also be criticised for basing its minimally required levels of income not 
on the success or failure of the specific business operations that the taxpayer conducts in its 
particular country, but instead on the financial success or failure during the year of the 
taxpayer’s global group as a whole. At least in theory, this feature of the revised TNMM will 
dilute some of the risk-mitigating effects of the income tax. Normally, when taxpayers invest to 
perform particular activities within a country, they can theoretically expect that the risks of that 
investment will be dampened by the fact that their tax burden will increase only in the case of 
success, and that failure will be cushioned to some extent by deductible losses in that country. 
                                                          
19  See note 17 above. 
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This risk-dampening effect would seem to be diluted if tax obligations in a particular country are 
determined by the taxpayer’s global, rather than local, financial results, from all the activities in 
which the group is engaged. 
 
This problem, however, seems likely to be less significant in practice than in theory. It would 
indeed be better from the perspective of mitigating financial risk to base tax results on a 
taxpayer’s local rather than global profitability – but the problems of transfer pricing 
administration over many decades have shown that measurement of local profitability with any 
degree of precision is infeasible. Indeed, the inherent technical problems of local income 
measurement appear to have contributed greatly to the current situation with respect to base 
erosion and profit shifting. In addition, the revised TNMM’s approach to benchmarking in effect 
allows multinational groups some degree of cross-border offsetting of losses and sub-part 
profitability – a feature that investors in the group as a whole should find attractive on grounds of 
risk mitigation.20 
 
It also might be objected that, under the revised TNMM, ‘start-up’ subsidiaries that are contained 
within profitable multinational groups might be required to report positive levels of income, even 
before they realistically could be expected to be earning a profit on a local basis. This prospect 
might be viewed as posing a disincentive to new inbound investment. It is unclear whether the 
taxation of local subsidiaries during a start-up period is entirely inappropriate as a conceptual 
matter. Arguably, all subsidiaries of a multinational group should be seen as supporting the 
operations of the group as a whole, even when some of the subsidiaries are in start-up phases, 
as all subsidiaries can be seen as mutually supportive parts of the group’s overall programme of 
geographic diversification. Thus, even in a start-up period a subsidiary can be seen as 
performing a service for the parent company, for which the subsidiary should receive net 
compensation. This argument, however, is not likely to be persuasive to developing country 
governments, which historically have perceived some kind of special tax treatment for start-up 
operations as being necessary to afford appropriate investment incentives. Accordingly, it is 
suggested that governments that currently accord new businesses tax incentives during a start-
up period continue to do so after adopting revisions to TNMM. 
 
Some may criticise the suggested revisions to TNMM on conceptual grounds, as a departure 
from a longstanding international consensus in favour of transfer pricing methods that adhere 
closely to reliance on data from comparables, and on refraining from reliance on group-wide 
financial results. It is true that both of these preferences are now deeply embedded in practice 
under transfer pricing law, and even minor departures from these tendencies might reasonably 
raise fears of unintended adverse effects. Conceptual models of taxation, however, are always 
approximate. International tax law is an amalgam of many different and sometimes idiosyncratic 
rules, which have been conditioned over time by a wide variety of practical considerations, 
political as well as economic. Models in tax policy and administration inevitably need to change 
from time to time, at least to some extent, to meet new economic and political needs; indeed, 
even the changes to the OECD Guidelines in 1995, which introduced the TNMM, responded to 
changing perceptions of the practical exigencies of transfer pricing administration. Conceptual 
models have their value in tax policy and administration, but they should not be elevated to the 
level of a controlling theology. In the current global environment, some departure from 
historically influential conceptual models should be seen as acceptable, if it can achieve 
politically viable improvements in the fiscal situation of developing countries. 
                                                          
20  An alternative to basing required margins, under TNMM, on consolidated group results would be to adopt a system of fixed 
margins similar to that employed by Brazil (see note 3 above). Fixed margins, however, would appear to involve more 
potential for economically anomalous results than the approach suggested here; moreover, fixed margins, unlike 
consolidated group margins reported in companies’ audited financial statements, are vulnerable to political manipulation.  
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4  Conclusion 
 
Revenue estimates will need to be made as a first step in considering the implementation of the 
proposals made in this paper. In addition, the adoption of changes to TNMM along the lines 
suggested in this paper will depend heavily on some measure of political support from the 
world’s large multinational companies, and from the governments of countries where the groups 
are based. On both political and economic grounds, however, proposals along the lines 
suggested above would appear to offer sufficient potential, from the standpoint of contributing to 
the fiscal wellbeing of developing countries, to justify careful evaluation, beginning with an 
assessment of their likely revenue effects. 
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